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(1) says that we are creatures such that if I experience a pleasure, it does not follow that 
anyone else experiences it. The question is why this gives me a special reason to care about 
my own pleasure. Phillips’s thought is that since it is a state of me (and not you), it must 
give me a special reason. But this seems awfully close to simply asserting the conclusion 
that I have a special reason to care about states of myself. At best, (1) seems a necessary 
preliminary to giving examples in which our intuitions would favor my favoring myself.
Phillips reconstructs Sidgwick as giving a deductive argument for egoism. Sidgwick 
intends something weaker. After noting (2), Sidgwick writes, “I do not see how it can be 
proved that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental” (Methods, 498). The point 
seems to be that if someone thought that the distinction between one individual and an-
other did matter to choosing between egoism and utilitarianism, it is hard to see how to 
show that he is wrong. Elsewhere, Sidgwick writes, “[E]ven if the reality and essentiality of 
the distinction between one individual and another be granted, I do not see how to show 
its fundamental practical importance to anyone [such as a utilitarian] who refuses to admit 
it” (“Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies,” 485). Sidgwick’s view is that the distinction 
between individuals is something to which more than one response is permitted. 
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Charles Peirce believed keenly in the reality of laws and universals. He claimed that despite 
modern naturalistic philosophy’s self-conception as triumphing over a dessicated Aristo-
telianism, a view of universals closest to that of Duns Scotus was “the philosophy which is 
best to harmonize with physical science” (1). Much high-quality scholarship outlining this 
aspect of Peirce’s thought already exists. However, this fine book lucidly systematizes it in 
a new synthetic approach to the problem that revives natural links between realism and 
a general theory of inquiry. For all modern realism’s claims to be ontologically committed 
to mind-independent entities, it has largely severed itself from a philosophical account of 
how to determine independent existence in particular cases, instead relying on natural 
science or “intuition.” Forster argues that this philosophical lacuna itself constitutes a form 
of nominalism; thus, realism in its deepest sense may be understood as explanatory ambition. 
The book begins by outlining why Peirce saw nominalism as such a threat. It “limits the 
scope and authority of reason and … yields far too much to scepticism in science, ethics 
and religion” (7). By contrast, Peirce ambitiously seeks “an ultimate impartial and binding 
basis for the organization of human life” (12). A great interest of this book is in tackling 
head-on what many contemporary philosophers have filed in the too-hard basket.
The main argument begins with an account of “the science of inquiry.” Forster outlines 
five requirements: it must be a priori, formal, universal, necessary, and normative, and must 
license metaphysical conclusions (20). This obviously means that it cannot be a natural science. 
But neither can it be grounded in appeals to pure reason, as these amount to reliance on 
intuition, which cannot “distinguish principles that are truly self-evident from those that 
only seem to be” (25). But natural or a priori science—what other option could there 
be? One of the great excitements of Peirce’s thought is how it frequently breaks time-
worn dichotomies with a third alternative. As a new foundation for the science of inquiry, 
Forster offers diagrammatic reasoning. Such reasoning is experimental, and thus more than 
intuition-mongering, yet there can be no mismatch between the way things are and the 
way they are represented to be, since the relations among elements of diagrams are the 
very objects of study. 
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In chapter 3, Forster uses diagrammatic reasoning to argue that nominalism cannot 
give an adequate account of continuity, for general concepts do not refer to collections 
of individuals but manifolds of actual and possible entities “welded together” (this issue is 
arguably insufficiently studied by metaphysicians). Next, Forster notes that the nominalist 
might claim that true continuity is a coherent hypothesis that cannot be verified, as the 
world consists solely of individuals. But he argues that Peirce’s pragmatic maxim chal-
lenges this, teaching that the meaning of a term is a general pattern of effects, expressed 
in hypothetical conditionals.
But why should we use the pragmatic maxim? Peirce worked long and inconclusively 
in his later years on a “proof of pragmatism,” which Forster claims can be reconstructed 
from his theory of symbols. It holds, roughly, that insofar as symbols are interpretable they 
require the interpreter to gauge their implications, which must be empirically accessible 
effects. This argument has many steps and I am not convinced Forster has nailed down 
every possible counterargument, but it is a worthy attempt.
The nominalist will protest that this epistemological story does not yet require meta-
physically real universals. In his mature work Peirce argued that universals may be directly 
perceived. Appreciating this requires an analysis of perception considerably more sophis-
ticated than today’s British empiricist legacy. Whereas for Hume the percept (impression) 
is directly copied into the sign (idea), for Peirce this approach “overlooks enormous dif-
ferences between the feeling of, say, a yellow quale and the term ‘yellow’ as it occurs in 
a judgment,” whose meaning “is dependent on the object it represents and its effects on 
interpreters” (114). Incorporating such judgments turns the meaning of a given perception 
from prior causes to future epistemic consequences.This account of perception is unknown 
to mainstream philosophy, and could be of great interest. 
Chapter 7 moves from perception to inquiry, arguing that the hypothesis of real uni-
versals is intelligible, and implied by the truth of any symbol. Chapter 8 argues for this 
hypothesis via an elegant reconciliation of correspondence, coherence, consensus, and 
instrumental theories of truth. Finally, chapters 9 and 10 explore Peirce’s argument for 
the reality of laws and his evolutionary cosmology, in which lawfulness itself evolves out 
of pure chance. The book ends with a discussion of the pursuit of truth as a moral ideal, 
arguing that “the nominalist is wrong to view human nature as a metaphysical fiction,” and 
the Good as purely “goods for this or that individual” (232). Rather, humans are capable 
of great selflessness in “the active realization of intelligent ideals” (245).
The writing in the book is careful and clear, with helpful chapter summaries. It will offer 
Peirce scholars new insights, as well as being a useful resource for advanced undergradu-
ates. One possible drawback is that it advances on so many philosophical fronts. It is hard 
to craft a definitive argument across mathematics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. 
But having said that, pursuing synthetic philosophy with real implications for human life 
is hard work, and Forster should be applauded for taking it on.
If you are a contemporary realist in the analytic tradition, please read this book! Such 
a combination of difference (from accepted philosophical wisdom) and depth is rare, and 
whether you agree or disagree with the position argued for, it will challenge your thinking 
in productive ways. 
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Jessica Berry provides the first detailed analysis of whether, and in what sense, Nietzsche was 
a skeptic (5). Exploring the affinity between Nietzsche’s work and Pyrrhonism in six main 
chapters, Berry differentiates between modern skepticism, understood as epistemological 
pessimism or nihilism (33), and Pyrrhonian skepticism as a commitment to continuing 
